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Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation. By THOMAS HILL GREEN. Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works. London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1895. — xxiv, 252 pp.

This reprint, furnishing a handy college text-book, is especially timely at this period when the *laissez-faire* theory of the state seems to be in process of abandonment in favor of a re-affirmation of the state's supremacy over individual action, more particularly under the forms of labor and temperance legislation. The editor, Bernard Bosanquet, has done well to prefix to the "Lectures" constituting the body of the book some twenty-five pages presenting the author's discussion of the "Different Senses of 'Freedom' as Applied to Will and to the Moral Progress of Man." The theories discussed with greatest prominence are those of the Stoics, St. Paul, Kant and Hegel. Professor Green's sympathies are in the main with Hegel, though modified by a conservative appreciation of Kant. The substantial result of the discussion is, that in its ordinary form the question between freedom and necessity cannot be answered because it is ineptly asked. The will is the man himself, the ethical person. So is reason the man himself, the rational person. In God these two are, of course, identical. In men, whether considered individually or historically, they only tend to become so. This is Professor Green's bond of union between the "pure" and the "empirical" ego. They are one and the same ego, viewed first as to its potentiality, second as to its momentary actuality. In the process of moralization which brings the latter nearer and nearer to the former, the state, as conceived by Hegel or the Greek philosophers, has an eminent part to perform. Professor Green is not oblivious to the efficacy of other agencies, for instance, the family, nor does he fail to observe that the state as it is — the "empirical" state — may be very far from fulfilling this function ideally. But he is clearly and consistently of opinion that the state as it should be — the "pure" state — will not only do so, but will take up into itself and strengthen with its own strength all the other relations and agencies. Underneath the strong influence of the German *Rechtsphilosophie* are discernible the perennially valuable Aristotelian conceptions, of which Oxford has never lost the tradition. The thorough blending of these two cognate systems of thought in a singularly sane and well-balanced mind gives to Professor Green's political philosophy great stability and wide and safe application.

It is almost unfair to attempt to epitomize the leading thought in a work so compactly reasoned. Were I to attempt it, I

should say that the cardinal principle upon which Professor Green grounds political obligation is twofold. In the first place, to state it negatively, if I question the rights of the state over me, I am denying the basis of my own rights. Outside of the state, taking that term in its widest possible significance, there are no rights. There may be might; there cannot conceivably be right. In the second place, to state the same point positively, my duties are corresponsive to my rights; and since the state partly furnishes and altogether safeguards the occasions for the discharge of these duties, or in other words, guarantees my existence as an ethical person, the highest aim of the "pure" state—if the reader will once more excuse the phrase—is coincident with the highest aim of the "pure" ego. It might be said that this twofold statement amounts to the same thing in the end. Professor Green would not hesitate, were he alive, to admit this. He would, in fact, strongly urge it. It is one of the many proofs of the remarkable soundness of his book that it treats the rights of the individual and the rights of the state, the duties of the individual and the duties of the state, only as different aspects of the same central ethical fact. The state can have no rights which interfere with the tendency toward a higher ethical development in the individual. The individual, as such, can have no rights against the state, as such, though it may be his duty, even if he be one of a numerically insignificant minority, to resist unrighteousness in the state. But note, that in so resisting, he is not affirming his individual likes or dislikes, but is urging an appeal for the benefit of the state, an appeal from what I have ventured to call the "empirical" state to the "pure" state. Obversely, note, that in thus preferring the eternal righteousness of the state to one of its passing phases of unrighteousness, he is at the same time living for his own progress towards the "pure" or "rational" ego.

In order to bring out this view and its derivative conceptions with greater clearness, Professor Green goes into detailed criticism of the views of Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The treatment is distinguished by a noble breadth and catholicity, and by concise amplitude of statement which neither verbosely dwells on *minutiae* nor fails fully to bring out any point that is really of moment. He rightly points out the greater barrenness of the Hobbesian as compared with the Spinozistic view, reexplodes the latter's identification of natural right with might, shows with clearness the progress of Locke beyond both Hobbes and Spinoza, and is especially true in his touch when dealing with that puzzling phase of Rousseau's

contract theory which discriminates between the "will of all" and the "general will."

By clarifying the last-named concept and placing it in juxtaposition with Austin's theory of sovereignty, he produces a particularly felicitous chapter on "Sovereignty and the General Will." While I should not venture to affirm that this chapter has absolutely settled the relations of these two difficult terms, all but an uncompromising analytical jurist will admit that it is an advance upon Austin.

His conception of what constitutes the principles of political obligation being thus emphasized by coincidences with, and rendered distinct by criticism of, antecedent theories, Professor Green deals to some extent with the following separate topics: "The Right to Life and Liberty," for which he proposes to substitute the right to free life; "The Right of the State over the Individual in War," which leads to a very well reasoned denial that the conception of war is at all compatible with the conception of what we have called the "pure" state; "The Right of the State to Punish," which bases punishment by a rather indirect line of argumentation upon the function of the state in maintaining rights as conditions of moral well-being; "The Right of the State to promote Morality," unfortunately a very short chapter; "The Right of the State in Regard to Property," which comes to a singularly lame conclusion in opposing to the single-tax proposition only the difficulty of distinguishing between "earned" and "unearned increment,"—a position which will probably be equally unsatisfactory to both parties in the controversy; "The Right of the State in regard to the Family," where at last, in denying that divorce should be granted for incompatibility, a postulate is made to do duty for an argument, since the affirmation that it is the object of the state to make marriage a "*consortium omnis vitae*" is nowhere argued out; and a brief intimation of a scheme of lectures on "Rights and Virtues." It is impossible not to regret that this scheme failed of being filled in.

After all, it may occur to the reader to ask: *Cui bono?* The treatment is neither positive nor historical; it is metaphysical. Of what particular use is metaphysics in the matter? The answer is twofold. We are living in a period of wide-spread individualistic, not to say anarchistic, belief. This necessitates, whether we will or not, a profound reëxamination of the grounds of political obedience. If political thinkers shirk this task, it will none the less continue to be attempted by the unthinking and the half-thinking. The seasonableness of Professor Green's *Principles of Political*

Obligation lies not least in the success with which he meets individualism on its own ground. This ground is distinctly, if crudely, metaphysical. The individualist, not to mention the anarchist, is indifferent to the historical, and directly opposed to the positive, treatment of the subject. To have met this evolutionary danger in its very brunt, and to have met it with large, calm reasonableness, is a distinct merit.

But there is an even greater value attaching to the work performed by Professor Green. The negative character of the *laissez-faire* period has left grievous evils to accumulate; and has allowed needful positive reforms to go at a snail's pace, if it has not been positively hostile to them. Indeed, the individualistic and anarchistic manifestations are danger signals arising from that very neglect or opposition. In restoring the maimed state to its fullness of function, while yet making the latter coincident absolutely with the needs for protection and development of the individual's highest good, Professor Green sets up a standard by which all existing institutions and all proposed reforms may with safety be tested. Altogether, therefore, Professor Green's book is at the present moment the best text on its particular specialty for the hands of our collegiate youth.

CHICAGO, ILL.

WM. J. ECKOFF.

La Teoria del Valore nella Storia della Dottrine e dei Fatti Economici. Di G. RICCA SALERNO. Roma, Accademia dei Lincei, 1894.

The distinguished Palermitan professor whose work is before us tells us that it is the result of a conviction that the theory of value has not yet received adequate historical treatment. His purpose, therefore, is to make a full and critical examination of the development of the theory, with especial reference to the objective economic phenomena that have accompanied the evolution. That such a study is of the highest importance cannot be questioned; and the qualifications of the author for the task no one would venture to dispute. While, therefore, we may not be satisfied that all the vexed questions about value are finally settled in the present volume, a summary of its contents cannot fail to be both interesting and suggestive.

Taking up first the general principle of value, Ricca Salerno starts from the theory of final utility, undertaking to show its historical development and its dynamic character. He reduces the theory